UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

In re: Proposed Waiver and Regulations Governing the Taking of Eastern North Pacific Gray Whales by the Makah Indian Tribe Hon. George J. Jordan Hearing Docket No. 19-NMFS-0001

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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EXPEDITED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO SUBMIT INITIAL DIRECT TESTIMONY AND FOR CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

On May 10, 2019, Sea Shepherd Legal (SSL) and Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS) (collectively "Sea Shepherd") moved for an extension of the deadline to submit initial direct testimony and continuance of the hearing and associated pre-hearing proceedings, requesting a delay of such proceedings by a minimum of 90 days. On May 15, 2019, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Makah Tribe (collectively "Respondents") submitted responses opposing Sea Shepherd's motion. Given the similarities in Respondents' materials, and in the interests of efficiency, Sea Shepherd replies to the arguments separately raised by Respondents in this single submission to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). In particular, Respondents' primary contentions are (1) the ALJ does not have the authority to grant the requested extension and (2) Sea Shepherd has not acted diligently in seeking an extension. As demonstrated below, there is not any factual or legal support for either claim.

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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EXPEDITED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME AND FOR CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

ARGUMENT

1. The ALJ Has the Full Authority and Discretion to Grant the Requested Extension

NMFS makes the surprising claim that the presiding officer in this matter, ALJ George J. Jordan (Judge Jordan), lacks the legal authority to extend certain deadlines associated with the hearing because "[t]he [g]overning [r]egulations [d]o [n]ot [p]rovide for [e]xtension of the [d]eadline for [i]nitial [d]irect [t]estimony." NMFS's Combined Response to Motion to Extend Waiver Proceeding Schedule (NMFS's Response), at 13. This argument fails on its own terms — the regulations *do* authorize the presiding officer to grant the relief requested. More fundamentally, NMFS's argument overlooks the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and governing case-law clearly recognize an ALJ's power to alter deadlines to ensure a fair proceeding.

NMFS acknowledges that the regulations governing a waiver hearing, a species of formal rulemaking, explicitly authorize the presiding ALJ to "[c]hange the time and place of the hearing." 50 C.F.R. § 228.6(b)(1); NMFS's Response, at 13. As explained below, this provision, when read in light of general administrative law principles and the APA, should be enough to conclude the obvious: Judge Jordan has the power to change the date of the hearing *and* associated pre-hearing deadlines.

However, NMFS goes beyond ignoring this obvious conclusion by offering a tortured interpretation of 50 C.F.R. § 228.7 – the rule governing the submission of initial direct testimony – which contains the following language:

Unless otherwise specified, all direct testimony, including accompanying exhibits, must be submitted to the presiding officer in writing no later than the dates specified in the notice of the hearing (§ 228.4), the final hearing agenda (§ 228.12), or within 15 days after the conclusion of the prehearing conference (§ 228.14) as the case may be.

50 C.F.R. § 228.7(a) (emphasis added).

While NMFS emphasizes three phrases ("all direct testimony," "must be submitted," and "no later than the dates specified in the notice of the hearing"), it conveniently ignores the language that

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introduces — and qualifies — those phrases. *See* NMFS's Response, at 14. Correctly interpreted, section 228.7(a) means what it says: The deadline for initial direct testimony is the date set in the notice of hearing "[u]nless otherwise specified." 50 C.F.R. § 228.7(a) (emphasis added).

The only remaining question is whether the presiding officer has the power to change that deadline and other associated pre-hearing deadlines. Clearly, someone must, otherwise the opening phrase is meaningless. NMFS certainly appeared to agree that the ALJ possessed such authority when, in declining Sea Shepherd's request for NMFS's consent to an extension, the agency stated that "any requests to delay the hearing schedule should be directed to Judge Jordan[,]" *See* Exhibit A to Declaration of Catherine Pruett (May 9, 2019 Letter from Barry Thom to DJ Schubert and Brett Sommermeyer, at 1. In addition to the fact that NMFS's should now be estopped from taking a contrary position, its contrived reading of the regulations clashes with basic APA and administrative law principles.

Section 556 of the APA invests the presiding officer with broad authority to "regulate the course of the hearing" and to "dispose of procedural requests or similar matters[.]" 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2), (9). While NMFS is correct to observe that these powers are "[s]ubject to published rules of the agency," nothing in the cited regulations, discussed above, purports to strip the presiding officer of the standard, unremarkable power to manage dates and the general course of the proceeding. In fact, the idea that an ALJ may adjust pre-hearing and hearing dates at his or her discretion is black-letter law. See, e.g., Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 685 F.2d 547, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("It is well established that the grant or denial of a continuance is within the discretion of the ALJ and will not be overturned absent a clear showing of abuse.") (quoting NLRB v. Pan Scape Corp., 607 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1979)).

When one reads 50 C.F.R. § 228.7(a) in conjunction with the well-established principles provided by the APA and governing case-law, it is clear that the regulation contemplates ALJ-ordered modifications to deadlines when it refers to those deadlines as being fixed "[u]nless

otherwise specified[.]" 50 C.F.R. § 228.7(a). In addition to being faithful to the regulatory text, this reading has the benefit of harmonizing the regulation with the APA.

In sum, there is no question that the presiding officer in this matter has the legal authority to grant all of the relief requested by Sea Shepherd.

2. Sea Shepherd Has Acted Diligently in Seeking an Extension

Respondents devote the majority of their briefing to an attack on Sea Shepherd's alleged lack of diligence in seeking an extension. In doing so, Respondents rely exclusively upon the "good cause" requirement found in Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) governing scheduling orders. While Sea Shepherd suggests that this standard may apply here, it should also be recognized that the rules applicable to this proceeding (50 C.F.R. § 228 et seq.) do not supply a standard governing requested scheduling modification. For this reason, Sea Shepherd also references the standards informing ALJ scheduling decisions as set forth in *PATCO v. Fed. Labor Relations Authority*, 685 F.2d 547, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

Assuming a "good cause" standard can be applied to this proceeding by analogy, NMFS supports its contention that Sea Shepherd failed to satisfy the "diligence" requirement of this standard on the basis of case law involving very distinguishable (and egregious) facts. The following is a summary of some of NMFS's primary case citations with a brief description of the relevant facts (which clearly are not even remotely analogous here):

- Husky Ventures, Inc. v. B55 Invs., Ltd., 911 F.3d 1000, 1020-1021 (10th Cir. 2018) ("The record—which indicates that B55, through Mr. McArthur, knew of the allegedly 'new' information months before the motion to amend [filed on the eve of trial] —fatally undercuts their ability to demonstrate good cause.")
- Enzymotec Ltd. v. NBTY, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 527, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), quoting Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. BMB Munai, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72659 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) ("As an initial matter, the Court notes that what is at issue here is not Plaintiffs' initial

pleading, nor their first amended pleading, nor even their second amendment. Rather, this is Plaintiffs' attempt at a fourth 'bite at the apple,' to articulate viable legal theories based on facts that were known to them before this action was ever commenced, in 2005.")

• Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Moreover, Alioto acted with insufficient diligence not merely because he waited to seek leave to amend for more than eight months beyond the district court's deadline. He waited until the last day—under a generous briefing schedule—for filing a response to the defendants' motion to dismiss. Indeed, he had defendants' motions to dismiss in his possession for more than two months before seeking leave to amend the complaint.")

The facts at issue in these cases cited by NMFS not only demonstrate the vastly different circumstances (vis-à-vis an administrative rulemaking proceeding) considered by federal courts in applying the "good cause" standard, but also the extreme lack of diligence upon which such courts find an absence of "good cause". In contrast, no remotely comparable facts are involved in Sea Shepherd's efforts to seek a reasonable extension here. Rather, Sea Shepherd (or, more precisely, SSL on behalf of itself and SSCS), has been as actively engaged as possible since the inception of this rulemaking proceeding. For the convenience of the ALJ, Sea Shepherd provides the following summary of the pertinent procedural (and related) facts supporting Sea Shepherd's diligence:

On April 6, 2019, when NMFS first published its notice of waiver and proposed regulations, SSL was in the midst of a number of time-sensitive and time-intensive projects that could not be pushed aside or otherwise delayed to immediately accommodate this unexpected development – after nearly 4 years of relative silence by NMFS since SSL submitted its comments on the 2015 Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). Nevertheless, SSL promptly reached out to other organizations that were also involved in commenting on the 2015 DEIS to attempt to coordinate efforts. *See* Declaration of Brett Sommermeyer (Sommermeyer Decl.), at ¶ 3.

- SSL was faced with a seldomly used administrative process governed by a dearth of procedural rules in comparison with *e.g.*, federal court proceedings. After an opportunity to obtain a rough inventory of the enormity of the materials filed by NMFS in support of the waiver and proposed regulations, SSL began exploring options for how to seek a reasonable extension of the hearing and associated deadlines. Given the absence of procedural rules, it was unclear whether NMFS, as the action agency that commenced the waiver proceedings and, apparently, selected the relevant dates driving those proceedings, had the discretion to extend the deadlines or whether that decision rested exclusively with the assigned ALJ. SSL ultimately decided to seek NMFS's consent to an extension while also joining as a "party" and, if NMFS declined, file a motion with the ALJ. See Sommermeyer Decl., at ¶ 4.
- After SSL filed its request for "party" status, NMFS notified SSL that its request had been received but did not inform SSL that it was now a "party". On May 9th, SSL was able to contact NMFS and obtain at least partial confirmation that it was likely a "party" to the proceeding. Notably, NMFS declined to fully confirm SSL's status. That same day, SSL received a letter from NMFS declining to consent to an extension and attaching a "Service List" listing a number of individuals and entities but not expressly identifying them as "parties". *See* Sommermeyer Decl., at ¶ 5.
- Although not completely confident that it was now a "party", SSL promptly filed its motion on behalf of itself and SSCS with the ALJ requesting an extension. On May 13th, counsel for

¹ In its Response, NMFS mischaracterizes the extent of materials that it submitted as direct testimony by describing it as only including 62 "new" documents, of which only 38 were published after the 2015 DEIS. NMFS's Response, at 8. A large portion of these materials consist of relatively obscure IWC submissions that are, technically, publicly available. *See*, Second Declaration of Chris Yates, NMFS Exhibit 1-18. However, NMFS offers no material basis for why Sea Shepherd should have had constructive notice of such documents. Additionally, focusing purely on document numbers is not meaningful. The attachments to NMFS's declarations (lengthy in themselves) included such documents as the 2019 Biological Report – an 89-page report containing detailed scientific information. *See* Declaration of Chris Yates, NMFS Exhibit 1-7.

NMFS entered an appearance and filed an intent to respond to the extension motion filed by AWI. On May 14th, SSL contacted counsel for NMFS and discovered that, despite service on NMFS, counsel had not received a copy of Sea Shepherd's motion. Counsel for NMFS expressed frustration with the process and the fact that there were few procedural rules governing this MMPA proceeding. *See* Sommermeyer Decl., at ¶ 6.

On May 17th, Sea Shepherd contacted Judge Jordan's office to provide notice that Sea Shepherd intended to file a Reply to the Respondents briefing later that day. From that call, Sea Shepherd learned that there was some potential confusion as to what had been submitted by the parties concerning the requested extension. In particular, Judge Jordan's office was apparently under the impression that all documents needed to be initially submitted through NMFS, which would then forward them to Judge Jordan. This understanding conflicts with NMFS's instruction to Sea Shepherd to submit its extension motion directly to Judge Jordan and also with the Announcement of Hearing Regarding Proposed Waiver and Regulations Governing the Taking of Marine Mammals (Docket No. 1) ("All documents pertaining to the hearing, including initial direct testimony, shall be filed with the ALJ."). Sea Shepherd further learned that Judge Jordan would be occupied with another hearing starting on May 20th. *See* Sommermeyer Decl., at ¶ 7.

Accordingly, the above-summarized facts illustrate Sea Shepherd's diligent efforts to accommodate this sudden, significant addition to its work-load while also navigating a sparsely-populated procedural landscape that has generated (and continues to generate) considerable uncertainty. Of note, Sea Shepherd's interactions with NMFS (and its attorneys) and Judge Jordan's office has demonstrated a more than sufficient level of uncertainty with this seldom-used rulemaking process to warrant, on its own, Sea Shepherd's requested relief.

Sea Shepherd's burden was not only exacerbated by procedural uncertainty, but also by NMFS's selection of a new action alternative governing the Makah hunt. Disagreeing that the

proposed alternative is "new", NMFS counters with the simplistic statement that "the proposed
waiver and regulations consist of a combination of elements from different alternatives in the 2015
DEIS, all of the environmental effects of which were fully evaluated." NMFS's Response, at 9.
While it is true that the new alternative borrows numerous elements from the 2015 alternatives, there
are considerable differences. For example, NMFS asserts that "Alternatives 2, 3, and 6 from the
2015 DEIS examine a winter/spring hunt, similar to the even-year hunt proposed in the waiver and
regulations, Alternative 4 examines a summer/fall hunt similar to the proposed odd-year hunt." <i>Id.</i>
This assertion misses a fundamental fact: none of the 2015 alternatives include both the "even" and
"odd" year seasonal hunts in the same scheme. Furthermore, none of the 2015 alternatives contain
the same combination of additional restrictions (e.g. strike limits, approach limits, landing limits or
other factors dictating when the hunt should be suspended) found in the new proposal – restrictions
that vary according to which phase the hunt falls into in the alternating (odd, even) year hunts. The
fact that the new alternative incorporates elements (often in different temporal, geographic and
quantitative combinations) from the 2015 alternatives certainly did not provide Sea Shepherd with
sufficient notice of this new alternative – and most definitely not the level of notice contemplated by
NMFS's inapposite case citation concerning pleading amendments under the FRCP. See id. (citing
Enzymotec).

Respondents further attack Sea Shepherd's diligence in seeking an extension by inappropriately discounting the problem presented by the apparent coincidence that NMFS released its waiver and regulation materials 35 days before the IWC Scientific Committee (SC) meeting. *Id.* at 10; Makah Indian Tribe's Response to Expedited Motions to Extend Waiver Proceeding Schedule (Makah Response), at 5-6. Yet, as participants in the IWC SC (and related IWC) meetings, Respondents must be aware of the fact that many (if not most) of the participants are occupied well in advance of the conference writing and finalizing working papers for submission at the conference. *See* Sommermeyer Decl., at ¶ 8. Participants are, thus, understandably focused on preparing for the

meeting to the exclusion of other matters. They often also arrive early to engage in pre-meeting discussions with their scientific colleagues. Id. It is, therefore, disingenuous to contend that the IWC meeting did not present a tremendous impediment to Sea Shepherd's ability to obtain assistance and direct testimony from cetacean experts attending the meeting. Such assistance would, of course, include expert input regarding additional topics outside the scope of NMFS's current record evidence – and thus, potentially, not within the scope of rebuttal testimony. Further, contrary to the Makah Tribe's suggestion concerning Dr. Sumich, Sea Shepherd has also been actively involved in soliciting input from cetacean scientists who are not attending the IWC meeting. *Id.* at ¶ 9. Again, NMFS's reference to a highly distinguishable FRCP Rule 16 case (Alioto) does not support a finding that Sea Shepherd failed to act diligently. See NMFS's Response, at 10. 10

As additional claimed support for its "lack of diligence" argument, the Makah Tribe contends that Sea Shepherd should have been aware of the proposed management plan because it was discussed during the 2018 IWC SC meeting. See Makah Response, at 4. However, it is not reasonable to assume knowledge of the details of the proposed Makah whaling regulations at issue in this proceeding from the cursory summary provided in the documents submitted during the 2018 IWC SC meeting. See Declaration of Patrick DePoe to Makah Response, Exbibit 2, at 6. It is also not reasonable to assume that Sea Shepherd would have known that the plan submitted for approval by the IWC SC in 2018 would be the one selected by NMFS for its proposed regulations. In this regard, it took nearly a year following the SC meeting for NMFS to present this plan in its proposed regulations. Additionally, there is no basis for a claim that Sea Shepherd should have known that the IWC SC's approval of the Makah plan at the 2018 meeting signaled that this was the plan that would ultimately be submitted by NMFS for approval in this proceeding. Notably, the IWC SC had also approved a different Makah whaling management plan in 2012, but this plan was apparently superseded by the current plan. Id. at 7 ("The Committee reviewed a US Management Plan for a Makah hunt of gray whales off Washington State (the Committee had evaluated a previous plan in

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2011 - IWC, 2011; 2012"), using the modelling framework developed for its rangewide review of gray whales (SC/67b/Rep07).").

With respect to the IWC SC, NMFS further claims that Sea Shepherd has not identified "any particular study, report, or line of research that is significantly different from the information already contained in the record." NMFS's Response, at 12. This allegation is untrue. Sea Shepherd specifically identified (by way of example) two relevant studies recently submitted to the IWC SC concerning the biological status of gray whales that reach the lagoons in Mexico at the end of their southward migration. *See*, Sea Shepherd's Expedited Motion To Extend Time and for Continuance of Hearing (Sea Shepherd's Motion), at 8. The referenced studies, and their general conclusions, are as follows:

• F. Ronzón-Contreras et al., Gray whales' body condition in Laguna San Ignacio, BCS, México, during 2019 winter breeding season, SC/68A/CMP/13, available at https://portal.iwc.int/e/sc68a# (login required):

Recent fluctuations in ocean environment conditions associated with warmer-than normal sea temperatures in the North Pacific/Gulf of Alaska may disrupt seasonal primary production during the summer months in the high latitudes where the gray whales feed (Belles 2016). This could impact and even reduce the availability of seasonal food that gray whales depend on during the summer to obtain sufficient energy to survive the winter and breed successfully. Recent observations of increasing "poor" condition gray whales and low calf production in the breeding and calving lagoons suggest that finding sufficient food is becoming a problem for the gray whales.

S. Martínez-Aguilar, et al., Gray whale (Eschrichtius robustus) stranding records in Mexico during the winter breeding season in 2019, SC/68A/CMP/14, available at https://portal.iwc.int/e/sc68a# (login required):

The connection between the increment of fair and poor body condition in the migration route and breeding areas (Ronzón-Contreras, et al. 2019), and the high numbers of stranding events including a majority of sub-adults and adults whales, is similar to observations during and following the 1999-2000 UME event, and seems to reflect gray whales are encountering difficulty obtaining sufficient sources of food in their feeding areas in their North Pacific and Arctic.

The above-summarized conclusions concerning observed gray whale conditions due to possible climate change-related effects on their food sources are contrary to (and based on more recent data than) the opinions expressed in the Declaration of Dr. David Weller submitted as direct testimony by NMFS. For example, Dr. Weller states:

- Climate change is likely to affect the availability of habitat and prey species, but species such as the gray whale (which feed on both benthic and pelagic prey) have been predicted in some studies, see, e.g., NMFS Ex. 3-41, at 17 (Bluhm and Gradinger 2008), to adapt better than trophic specialists. April 5, 2019 Declaration of Dr. David Weller (Docket No. 5), ¶ 24.
- Durban et al. (2017) noted that a recent 22 percent increase in ENP gray whale abundance over 2010/2011 levels is consistent with high observed and estimated calf production between 2012 and 2016. *Id.*, ¶ 25.
- Recent increases in abundance also support hypotheses that gray whales may experience more favorable feeding conditions in arctic waters due to an increase in ice-free habitat that might result in increased primary productivity in the region. NMFS. *Id.*

Accordingly, the opinions expressed in the two IWC SC documents referenced in Sea Shepherd's Motion are most certainly "significantly different from the information already contained in the record." NMFS's Response, at 12. Seeking consideration of such new (and contradictory) scientific evidence is also not akin to asking NMFS "to supplement an EIS every time new information comes to light after the EIS is finalized." *Id.* (quoting *Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council*, 490 U.S. 360, 373 (1989)). In this instance, NMFS has not finalized its EIS and, therefore, has a statutory duty to rely upon the best available scientific evidence before finalizing its EIS analysis in this matter.

The two new IWC SC working papers referenced by Sea Shepherd (again, only by example) also counter NMFS's argument that "the number of gray whale deaths this year do not provide an appropriate basis to delay the hearing." *Id.* Specifically, these papers may help to explain the rash of recent gray whale strandings (standing now at 57 dead whales, including 12 additional strandings since Sea Shepherd filed its Motion on May 10th – just 7 days ago), which may signal the beginning of a new Unusual Mortality Event. *See* Sommermeyer Decl., at ¶ 10. On this point, NMFS

speculatively states: "While we have yet to determine the cause of the increased strandings in 2019,			
with gray whales at record numbers in recent history it would not be unexpected to see increasing			
whale densities translate into higher mortality / strandings and lower calf production and survival."			
NMFS's Response, at 13. To the extent that NMFS is arguing that the strandings are due to gray			
whales reaching carrying capacity, it should be noted that a reduction in carrying capacity due to			
climate change may also be responsible. See F. Ronzón-Contreras et al., Gray whales' body			
condition in Laguna San Ignacio, BCS, México, during 2019 winter breeding season,			
SC/68A/CMP/13, available at https://portal.iwc.int/e/sc68a# (login required) ("Perhaps during the			
past decade, the ENP gray whale population has reached the current 'carrying capacity' of its high-			
latitude feeding areas, and/or that the capacity for the marine environment to produce gray whale			
prey has changed."). In any case, this new information is relevant to the criteria for granting an			
MMPA waiver, as all cumulative impacts must be considered, and, thus, should be considered now,			
not "during the final decision-making and preparation of an [sic] Final Environmental Impact			
Statement for this matter." NMFS's Response, at 13.			
CONCLUSION			
For the foregoing reasons, Sea Shepherd respectfully requests that Judge Jordan grant its			
reasonable request for an extension of at least 90 days. Sea Shepherd further renews its request for			

an expedited ruling on its motion in order to secure a decision before the May 20th deadline.

Dated this 17th day of May 2019

s/ Brett W. Sommermeyer Brett W. Sommermeyer (WA Bar No. 30003) SEA SHEPHERD LEGAL 2226 Eastlake Ave. East, No. 108 Seattle, WA 98102 Phone: (206) 504-1600 Email: brett@seashepherdlegal.org

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2 | I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing Reply in Support of Expedited Motion for Extension

of Time to Submit Initial Direct Testimony and for Continuance of Hearing upon the following

4 | Parties to this proceeding at the addresses indicated below via electronic mail:

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5	NMFS	NMFS	
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On the same date, I served the foregoing document to the following party first class mail to:

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1	Dated this 17 th day of May 2019.	
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